(1) D.G. James, “The Romantic comedy – An essay on English Romanticis,”, Oxford University Press 1963; “… Blake may fittingly be comapered with Spinoza. For Blake had, if anyoe ever had the anima naturaliter hristiana, which shows itself in his writings. But he aso set his face firmly againt the Christian tradition in which he was reared and combated it trhoughout much the greater part of his work. In reagrd to the second, Blake like Spinoza, exalts deseire to a placeof the highest importance. Spinoza had indeed to resort to understanding, at the priceof consistency, for salvation; but in the doctrine of The Marriage of Heaven and Hell we hear little of understanding and reason. If they are mentioned, it is to call them the ‘usurpersof the place of desire’; they are the enemiesof ‘energy’ and therefore of the emancipation of the senses and of the imagnation. Now Spinoza’s theoretical inconsistency though deplorabe philosophically, rescues his ethic and gives it a peculiar importance in the history of human thought. But Blake’s ethic, sof ar as Blake may be said to develop it, although consistent, hardly merits begin taken seriously. Spinoza acknowledgeds, in effect, however unwilingly, that advance to the ife of fredom iis thorugh conflict beteen ‘desire’ and ‘understanding’; Blake apears to beleive that any such conflict should cease and that desire should be given free rein. He wishes hus, thatis to say, to be as ‘natural’ oas possible, and thinks that we can, if e wish, beentirely natural. To be atural, to be ourselves, as he thinks, through placing no restraint upon ourselves, would be to have freedom and an immense enrichment of ourives and or our imaginations. /
(2) Passim: So much at least Blake certainly appears to believe. But he shows little of any signof ahving thought with any care concerning this starngedoctrine. In fact, it requires little thougt to see that waht Balke says is both confused in itself and contrafy to the facts of experence. It is not difficult to show, inthe First place, how confusedit is. In act, it requires little thought to see that what Bake says is both confused in itself en conrtary to the facts of experience. It is not diffcult to show, in the First palce, how confucsed it is. He wishes us to be creaturs of desire and imagination, not of moral restraint and reason; a violent antiintellectulism goes alng with his desire that mankind should release itself from a moral state in which chekck is placed upon impulse . Now animals have not reason, nor do they chose. But Blakes doesnot, we may resume, wish us to become animals in the sense that we shall become incapable fo reason;o rif, in his vague dreaming, he did desire this, he could only do so by forgetting that if we had not reason we cerainly would not have imagination. For it is certain that imagination, whatever it may of may not be, cannot possbly act in independence of the nowledge afforded us by the prcessus of thougt. Without power of thought awareness of a world of object as objects is not possible. It is foolish to think that, our intelecutal nature desrowyed, we could then be possessed of imagination, wheteher or not apprehenindg infinity in all things. If the imaginaiton may ever, in any sense, be sid to transcend thougt, it can do so, we may bes ure, onlu, in part at least,throughthe previous aid of thougt; and with this Spinoze, for his part, would have emphatically agreed, for hi ‘scienttia intuitiva’ isno mee collapse below the level of the rational, but a consummation of the rational. Without the aid of thought, the iamgination has no world in which to act, no materials to refashion. It may be indeed that, as Kant said, thought without imagination is helpless; but it is certain that iamgination without thought is tillborn. It is all very well to be vaguely and grandly anti-intellectualist; and no doubt it may well bet hat the intelligencehas its limits.But whatever the inteligence may not do, it is the height of folly and vague emotionlaim to overlook what in fact it does. Spinoza was wiser in trying to see … man’s rational and moral life as a partof what he regarded … as man’s animal nature. /
(3) Passim: Let us therefore accquit Blake of so extreme and mistaken a view, more perhaps fot he sake of the argument hanin cnfidence hat he did nt think something Lieke this. If he desired that we should remain intelligent creaturs, he seems nevertheless to have thougt that thrugh the continued parcticeof not restraining our desires we should reach a state of equilibirum in which acting wholly on iimulse, whe should be happy, stabe, and social. This of course asumes a great deal as to what human nature is really like, ansd as to what it ‘naturally’ is. But putting this aside, it requires a curious lack of thought to belveivetht beign whose inteligens is at all more noticable than that of animals [even if thier life be lived for ever in a Garden of Ede or happy South Sea island] could live in ignoranceof experience of choosing. Blake of course is ware that the presence in us of reason is part and parcel of our leves as moral beings. But if we are at a to eve and intelgent [and threrefore imaginatie life, it is inconceivable that we can with any show of sense hope for our release from a moral state in which we are constantly confronted with alternative Lines of action No doubt we can sympathise with his lining for wholeness of mind an dfredom; but it is certain that is doctrine, offering the way of fingththse things, is very confused. /
(4) Pasim: In the second place, if his idea is confused in itself, it is also clear that he could only have envisaged, however vagueley, this kind of innocence and fredom by overlooking certain important factors; and another Romantic riter, wrting indeed without any knowledge of Blake, thrugh aware that htis kind of belief was abroad at the time, obsered whtat these facotrs are. Keats said in one of his letters that he did not ‘at all believe in this sort of perfectibility’. // ‘The nature of the world’, he went on, ‘will not admit of it – the inhabitants of the world will correspond to itself. Let the fish Philosophise the isce away from the Rivers in winter time and they shall be at contnual paly in the tepird delightsof Summer. Look at the Poles and at the Sands of Arica, Whirlpools and volcanoues – Let men exterminate them and I will say that tey may arrive at earthly Happiness – The point at which Man mary arrive is as far as the parallel ste in sensation, it blooms on a beautiful morning it enjoys itself – but there comes a cold wind, a hot sun – it cannot escape it, it cannot destroy its annoyances – theyr are as native to the world as itself …’ // But this is no all. // ‘The most interesting question that can come before us it, How far … mankind can be made happy – I can iagine such happiness carried to an extreme – but what must it end in? – Death – and who could in such a case bear with death – the whole troubles of life which are now frittered away in a series of years, would then be accumulatd for the last days of a being who instead of hailing its appoach would leave this word as Eve left Paradise’. // So do Keat’s almost casual remarks demolish Blakee’s vague daydreaming. It required a curious perversity to overlook the considerations which occupy Keat’s sentences, and in disregard fort hem to try to see in an obscurely conceived ‘natural innocence’ what might be an end for human ife. //
(5) Passim: Fianlly, Blake’s beliefs appear to rest on the assumtion that our desires are somehow good and must lead to happness.But the great mass of opinon agress that there is little or no ground for ths belief; and that on the contratry the expeirenceof the race leads ut to cnclue that human nature is in part at least naturally eveil. This is also the view of Christianty , and Blake himself, irrittingly enough, appears to have thought so from time to time [here, however, agin he went to extremes – ‘Man is only evil’ he said]. Now if this is so, and the human will mysterously infected with evil, only a supernatural agency can save it. The Crhistian belief, wheter right or worng, is that the evil natural to us is finally expunged by the grace and act of God. That act, moreover, does not restore us to the innocence of an Adam in Eden; we are ‘made new new in Christ’ and in that state indeed are redeemed from tme in the knowledge of God. The evil in man is overruled by God to serve teh purposesof an new cratin. But thise beliefs are altogether opposed to those of The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, and Balke cannot have them both. Sooneror laater he must come to acknowledge, if not Christianity, the absurdity of his belief in ‘desire’. But it will be a long time before this acknowledgement comes; and in th First group of propheti corks, to which we shall now turn, it is the gospel of desire which he preaches. In them he paapearts to llk, not for the ‘innocence’ of eternal life, which Christianity promises, but a wholly natural innocense. He will try, in thes prophetic books, to set out in poetry a notion and ideal, confused in itself, and divorced from the plain facts of the world and of life.”
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(6) D.G. James, “The Romantic comedy – An essay on English Romanticis,”, Oxford University Press 1963; “Both Uranos and Urizen are jeaous gods and fathers. I do not wish to erect a vague enough similarity into a show of certainty; but the matter is at least worth considerations. Also, it is worth noticing the following passage. In the Third Night of Vala, Urizen, addressing Ahania, says: ‘O bright Ahania, a Boy is born of the dark Ocean / Whom Urizen doth serve, with Light repenishing his darkness. / I am set here a Kingof trouble, commanded here to serve / And do my ministry to those who eat of my wide table. / All this is mine, yet I must serve, and that prophetic boy / Must grow up to command his Prince; but hear my determin’d decree: / Vala shall become a Worm in Enitharmon’s Womb, / And Luvah n the loinsof Los a dark and furious eath. / Alas for me! What will become of me at that dread time?’ // This passage like most in Blake’s work, is obsucure enough. Whatever else Urizen may be saing, it seem clear that th e anticipates taht a child wil be ron, presumably of Los and Enitharmon [the sinificance of whom we need not ere apuse to consider], who will oertrouw Urizen – ‘that Prophetic boy must grow up to command his Prince’. Now in fact a child [Orc] is brn to Los and Enitharmon – a ‘fiery child’ [Vala, Fifth Night]; and it is he who oertrows the power of Urizen. In the Sevent night of Vala Urizen is terrified by the appearance of Orc, whom he recognizes as fulfilmnet of a prophecy. I suggest that here aso we have an adaptation of Greek myth. Bot Uranos and Zeus feared the power of a child yet to be born and that this child would overthrouw them. We can plausibly believe that any mythology attract Blake’s interest. REbellion against established Deity was a favourite theme with hi as it was to be with Sehlly. Certainly if Blake was drawing, consciously or unconsciously on Greek mythology, het ook little care to follow the myths closely; but this indeed could hardly be expected, for reasons which will become clear later on. /
(7) Passim: We shall regun again to this mater. For the rpesent, we must observe two other stand which ent tothe makingof the tangle of Blake’s mythology. They are Milton’s version of the conflict of God and Satan, and the sory of the life and eath of Christ. The Marriage for heaven and Hell is based on Blake’s rick of reversing the roles of God and Satan in paradise Lost. Milton never failed, right up to the end, as Milton shows, to fascinate Blake, and the great bulk of the group of poems we are considerng in Marriage of Heaven and Hell Blake says that the Jehovah of the Bible is ; no other than he who dwells in flaming fire’. ‘it need appear’d to Reason s if Desire was cast out; but the devil’s account is, that the Mesiah fell and formed a heaven of wht he stole from the Abyss.’ Thus, what Milton called satan was really the Messiah, or Desire of Energy. ‘The reason Milton wrote in fetters wehn he wrote ofangels and God, ant at liberty when of the Devil and Hell, is because he was a true poet and of the Devil’s party without knowing it.’In bearing thsse pasages in mind, which are of the greatest importance in reading Balke’s Prophetic Works, it is also useful to bear inmind Shelley’s famous remark that ‘The only imaginary begin resembling in any degree Prometheus, is Satan’; and shelly goes on to attribute tot satan as to Prometheus, ‘courrge, and majesty, and firm and patient opposition to omnipotent force’. Again, in the Defence of Poetry, Shelley observee that ‘Nothing can exceed the energy and magnificence of the character of Satan in Paradise Lost … Milton’s Devi as a moral begin is far superior to his God … and tis bold neglectof a direct moral purpose is the most decisive proof of the supremacy of Milton’s genus’. These remarks at once link Shelley with Bake, and Promethus with Satan. Orc is the Satan and urizen the God of Paradise Lost. /
(8) Passim: W mut not, hoewever, imagine that Balkeg ie a consistent and clear version ofthe story ofthe fall of Satan and of his temptationof Adam and Eve. In addition, i think there were good reasons why Blake cold not folow Milton’s story of Satan our cosely, just as there wer good reasons why he could not folow the Prometheus story closely. Of thse we sahll spak at a later juncture; my immediate purposeis only to indicate this important component in Blake’s confused mytholoy. Inthe Sevent Night of Vala, in its First version Orc is represente in his caves in a manner which recalls Satan in the First book of Paradise Lost. ….. We are no perhaps in a position to consider the naureof Blake’s atemps at mythology. I have said that Blake uses a number of myths for is purposes: soem fragments at elastof Greek mytholgoy, the Miltnic myth as me may call it, and the Christ myth. Someof his later use of these mthses we shall observe at another stage. Bur we have aready seen that he uses nn of these myths with care; he runs peicesof them into an clearness of outline. They run into each other ad are mingled quite bewilderingly; and if their outlnes, singly, are lot sight of Blake’s synthesis equally has no Sharp utline. That this is so, no reader of Blake takes long to discover I have ilusrated Blake’s irresponsibility by speaking of his arbitrariness in giving substantially the same figures different names when it pleases him to do so. And it would not be at all difficult to show his disregard for elementary rulesof communication in several other respects. / our immediate purpose, however, is to notice Blake’s use of mythology in the light of what we may think his puroses was in writing these peoms. The preceding paragraphs represent, I believe, a substantially correct recod, sof ar as it goes, of Blake’s doctrine. If so, it may be of some value to consider his mytholgiy as an expresion of his beliefs Sof ar, I have spoken of Blake’s Prophetic Books can with equal justice he said to be allegorical; and that at lest a partof this failure is due to his having fallen bewten the two stools of mythology and allegory. /
(9) Passim: Now a mth is not a thing which springs, fully formed, from the head of any man; it grows up as partof the cuture of a eople or peoplesNow Boake, seting out to creat a mythology, however original he may intend it to be, in fact drwas upon the mythology and symbols of the past. He takes pieces ofthem, uses tehm very much as he wishes, jons them togheter acts in no loyalty to any one. Aso, because a myth is not a quick creation but a slow development, it has a richness and a depth which are inexhaustible. In it the symbol and what is symbolized are wellnigh inseparable; the symbol is apprehended with a singlenessof mind in which thoughts are, as it were, more percieived and felt than explicitly grasped as thoughts. No philosophy of religion is a substitute for symbolic figures and events; in the last resort a theology is baren in comarison withthe contemplation of the story. Now an allegory on the other hand may well spring, neat and fully grown, from the mind of an indivdueal. But it differs from a mth in a very important respect. In allegory, thought and its figurative expresion run, so to speak, side by sisde. We must have both a narrative and a clear conceptual scheme; we re awareofth story as illustrative of the rality whih it treats of. Thse two tings cannot become one in allegory, by its ery nature; they remain appart. Certainly, they illuminate each other; but our minds are kept moving back and fore between narrative and meaning. These two tings cnnot become one in aegory, by its very nature; they reamin apart. Certainly, they illuminate each other; but our minds ae keptmoving back anffd fore bewteen narrative and meaning. It may besaid thatthe difference betwen myth ad allegory is primriy one of degree; and this may be allowed. A successful allegorist willl certainly exert himself to reduce the gap bwteen what is tougt and what is perceived; but it ramins partof the idea of allegory and the gap not wholly obliterated. /
(10) Passim: Curiously enogh, Blake has himself some iluminating remarks to make on this topic. Speaking probably of Vala, possibly of Milton, he says in a letter ritten to Butts in July 1803, that ‘it is the Grandest Poesm that this World Contains. Allegory addressed to the Intellectual power, while it is altogether hidden from the Corporeal Understanding, is my Definition of te Most sublime Poetry …’ But he says elsewhere, nthe note called A Vision of the Last Judgment, ‘Fable or Allegory are a totally distinct and inferior kindof Poetry. Visio nor Iagination is a Representation of what Eterally Exists, Really and Unchangeabley. Fable or Allegory is form’d by the Daughtersof Memory. … Note here htat Fable or Allegory is seldom without some Vision ought to be known as Two Distinct Things.’ Blake’s prose is rareley more easy than his verse; and the difference between wat Balke Calls the ‘INtellectual Powers’ and what he calls the ‘Corporeal Understanding’ is by no menas clear to tme.The Significant matter in tese reamrks is, however, this conclusion that allegory’ is inferiro to ‘iionn’; and we may perhaps take Blake to mean sutantially what I treid to express above. Myeth, we may say, partakesof ‘ision’; allegory partakesof ‘vision’ only partialy, and involves constant apeal to memory and to explicit intelctual processes. In this sense, it is not only myth which may appeal to ‘vision’. The highest forms of literature, whether using myth or nog, may do so. The difference between King Lear and The Faerie Queene is not far to seek. This dference etwen myth and alegory is cardinal. / We may add, though with less conidence, that mytht is most feuently cosmological and represents deities in ther ceations of worlds or their dealings with men; allegory is psychological, setting forth states and pwoer in the human mind in thier reaction upon and conflict with one another. Myth is born of speculation alleory of introspection; the frmer is outward-looking, metaphysical, ad springing from wonder, the latter inwardlooking, moral, and sprnging form mental conflict and suffering.”